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•	 Network analysis offers a new approach to under-
standing the complex relationships among par-
ticipants in Canada’s Large Value Transfer System 
(LVTS), the main system used for clearing and 
settling transactions between financial institutions.
•	 Network analysis can help payments-system 
supervisors to better understand the importance of 
individual participants in the system and the con-
nections between them. 
•	 Research using network analysis that takes ac-
count of the intensity of transactions between 
groups of LVTS participants suggests that there 
are two communities of participants in the LVTS: 
one consisting of the five major banks and an-
other consisting of some smaller, more regionally 
focused participants that interact closely with one 
another. 
A
 stable and efficient financial system is a critical 
 component of a well-functioning economy. It  
 intermediates the flow of funds between savers 
and borrowers, and it helps to allocate risk to those 
best able to manage it. In assessing the risks and 
vulnerabilities of the financial system as a whole, it is 
important to understand the relationships among 
financial institutions, markets, and infrastructure (e.g., 
trading links, risk exposures, and payment 
relationships).
One of the central pieces of infrastructure in a well-
developed financial system is its large-value or whole-
sale payments system used to process payments 
between financial institutions. Financial Institutions 
(FIs) transfer significant dollar amounts through these 
systems, as they process payments among them-
selves on behalf of their clients. Canada’s wholesale 
payments system—the Large Value Transfer System 
(LVTS)—is a systemically important payments system. 
The rules and risk controls of this system insure that 
as payments pass the system’s risk controls 
throughout the day, they are final and irrevocable.
1 
The LVTS is a key infrastructure in the financial system 
because LVTS payments are used to complete 
important business transactions and to settle 
Canadian-dollar obligations arising from securities 
and foreign exchange transactions. Every business 
day, the LVTS successfully completes thousands of 
transactions worth billions of dollars. In 2008, the 
wholesale payments systems of the G-10 countries 
processed a total value of payments that was 
62.2 times their GDP, on average; for Canada, this 
ratio was 28.7 times (BIS 2009).
2 Given the central role 
1  Arjani and McVanel (2006) provide an overview of the structure of the LVTS and its 
relationship to the Canadian financial system. 
2  A possible explanation for Canada’s lower ratio of payments to GDP is that some large 
participants in the LVTS settle a significant amount of payments between clients across 
their own books, rather than with another participant through the LVTS.
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actions settled through them, financial-stability policy 
making and oversight of systemically important infra-
structure, in particular, can benefit from under-
standing the relationships that exist between 
participants in these systems.
A wholesale payments system, such as the LVTS, can 
be thought of as a complex network in which the 
relationships between its member FIs can be mod-
elled using the tools of network analysis. network 
analysis is an interdisciplinary field that has developed 
in the past decade (Vega-redondo 2007). It examines 
the bilateral relationships in a given system of partici-
pants and then considers the overall effect that a 
given pattern of bilateral relationships can have on the 
system as a whole. The application of network 
analysis is relatively new to financial economics. 
In this article, we review work done at the Bank of 
Canada and at other central banks that applies net-
work analysis to data on payments systems.
3 These 
techniques give us a new approach to analyzing the 
systemic risks inherent in payments systems. known 
as payment networks, this branch of network analysis 
focuses on payments systems and draws on tech-
niques from monetary economics.
Modelling Payments Systems  
as Networks
Given its oversight responsibilities for designated 
payment, clearing, and settlement systems under the 
Payment, Clearing and Settlement Act (PCSA), the 
Bank of Canada has a strong interest in better under-
standing the behaviour of the LVTS and ensuring that 
it is well risk-proofed. A network approach provides a 
framework for understanding the complex interrela-
tionships between participants in a payments system 
in a way that complements conventional economic 
modelling. 
The payment-network approach to modelling is typ-
ically implemented as follows: a payments system is 
simplified into a set of nodes, where each node repre-
sents a participant in the system (e.g., a bank). The 
nodes form a network by being linked to each other 
according to key financial relationships. For example, 
the network approach could be used to model pay-
ments, securities trades, loans, or credit limits. The 
3  A related body of research takes a network approach to analyze the balance-sheet 
exposures of banks. See for example (Gauthier, Lehar, and Souissi 2010) or (Gauthier, 
He, and Souissi 2010).
links that are modelled will depend on both the data 
available and the questions being addressed. Two 
possible areas of interest involve understanding how 
financial shocks or problems can spread from one 
institution to others (financial contagion) and meas-
uring the systemic importance of different participants.
By identifying and studying the links 
between participating institutions, 
researchers can better understand 
whether the interconnected nature 
of payments-system participants 
increases or reduces the resiliency 
of the system to shocks.
Financial contagion can be better understood by 
examining how participants are connected as a net-
work, because the links studied in network analysis 
can present avenues through which financial shocks 
could spread to other institutions. however, when 
applying network analysis, consideration must be 
given to the nature of the links being studied. For 
example, although some links can provide channels 
through which financial disruptions could spread 
among LVTS participants, other links can promote 
resiliency by dispersing risk among participants. By 
identifying and studying the links between partici-
pating institutions, researchers can better understand 
whether the interconnected nature of payments-
system participants increases or reduces the resili-
ency of the system to shocks. This framework allows 
the overseer of the system to appropriately monitor or 
mitigate any potential risks. 
network analysis allows us to examine how participants 
are linked to one another. A network may be quite 
simple, where each institution transacts with only a few 
others and knows the risk exposures of its counter-
parties. It could, however, be quite complex, where the 
number and size of each institution’s counterparties 
varies greatly. The complexity of the network itself can 
contribute to increased uncertainty (haldane 2009; 
Caballero and Simsek 2010). For example, complexity 
can be a factor in market disruption because partici-
pants are uncertain regarding their counterparties’ 
exposures to a troubled institution. A better under-
standing of the network of relationships (links) can help 
to reduce uncertainty in stress scenarios.
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approach to assessing the systemic importance of 
particular participants in a payments system by identi-
fying participants that might have a large impact on a 
system if they default or have some type of liquidity 
problem. This approach is useful, given that the effects 
on the payments system of operational, credit, or 
liquidity events at one participant would be a function 
of both the participant’s size and its interconnected-
ness. Interconnectedness depends on the breadth and 
intensity of a participant’s financial relations with other 
members of the payments system. A participant could 
be considered highly connected, and therefore 
important to the system, if it transacts with many par-
ticipants or if its transactions represent large values 
(possibly with few participants). network analysis can 
help to provide a more complete picture—beyond 
simple measures of value and volume of transactions—
of a participant’s role and importance in a system. 
In summary, the network approach to payments sys-
tems provides a new conceptual framework to assess 
their vulnerabilities and risks. research in this area, as 
well as the resulting tools, can complement existing 
approaches of conventional economic modelling or 
statistics. 
Recent Research
research into payments-system networks can be 
divided into two broad categories. The first category, 
network topology, seeks to describe the key features 
of a typical payment network. The second category, 
network characteristics, seeks to use these features, 
along with economic theory, to help uncover previ-
ously unknown and potentially important insights 
about the payment network.
Network topology of the LVTS
The way in which a payment network is measured and 
understood is through its topology, which is the pat-
tern (or layout) of the links between nodes. The top-
ology of the network characterizes the structure and 
functions of complex networks and can assist in 
understanding how the structure of a network influ-
ences its stability, resiliency, and efficiency in the face 
of a disruption. 
The seminal study of payment-network topologies is 
by Soramäki et al. (2007). In their paper, the authors 
describe the payment network composed of nodes 
that represent members of the Fedwire Funds 
Service, the wholesale system at the centre of the 
U.S. financial system, operated by the Federal 
reserve, and links that represent the existence of a 
payment between two members. They show that this 
network displays the classical features of a complex 
network; that is, the number of links that originate with 
a given node follows a power-law distribution, where 
the network has a few nodes with many links and a 
large number of nodes with few links.
4 This hub-and-
spoke-like structure of the network implies that the 
Fedwire system is resilient to a random outage but 
may be vulnerable to a shock that affects a strongly 
connected node. 
Embree and roberts (2009) provide a characterization 
of Canada’s LVTS using a network-topology approach 
similar to that of Soramäki et al. They find that the 
LVTS is, in general, a highly connected network, with 
a small number of large participants at the centre. The 
finding that a small group of participants form the hub 
of a payments system is common to the network 
analyses of wholesale systems in many other coun-
tries. This structure can be seen in Chart 1, where 
nodes represent the 14 LVTS members, and links 
represent average daily payment flows during 2008. 
A discernibly small number of these banks are more 
strongly connected than other participants.
Examination of how this tendency towards centraliza-
tion in a hub evolves within an average day reveals 
that it is typically higher at the beginning and the end 
of the day than during the rest of the day. This sug-
gests that during these two periods, certain partici-
pants may play a more significant role in the payment 
network than at other times of day.
4  A power-law distribution is a probability distribution that exhibits scale invariance: for a 
given ratio of two values in the distribution, the relative frequency of encountering the 
two values does not change. For example, with a power-law exponent of 2, a node of 
degree 6 is four times less frequent than a node of degree 3; a node of degree 10 is four 
times less frequent than a node of degree 5. Many man-made and natural phenomena 
exhibit this property (e.g., the ranking of cities by population). 
Chart 1:  Average daily gross payment ﬂ  ows in 
the LVTS, 2008
Can$ billions
Source: Bank of Canada
 0.01  0.1  1  5  10
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structure of the LVTS
In addition to the work that characterizes the network 
topology of payments systems, a second fruitful 
avenue of research involves exploring the structure of 
the payment network to uncover characteristics that 
would not be apparent from simply focusing on the 
behaviour of an individual member of the payments 
system. Such characteristics may include identifying 
key participants for circulating liquidity in the system, 
as well as participants that are important for subgroups 
of system participants. This type of study depends on 
intimate knowledge of the institutional features of the 
payments system. Because of these information 
requirements and the recent development of this field, 
there are only a handful of published studies that fit into 
this category. These include two empirical Bank of 
Canada studies that use certain readily observable 
transaction linkages among the direct participants in 
the LVTS to uncover important payment behaviours 
and relationships that are hard to see by examining the 
behaviour of each participating FI in isolation. 
In the first study, Bech, Chapman, and Garratt (2010) 
examine the implicit network structure defined by the 
bilateral credit limits (BCLs) among participants. They 
then develop a method of determining which partici-
pant is likely to hold the most liquidity at any point in 
time during the payment cycle.
5 The authors charac-
terize this participant as being “central” to the system. 
A central participant plays an important role in ensuring 
that liquidity flows through the system and therefore 
that payment activity continues to function smoothly. 
This has important policy implications, since a well-
functioning payments system requires that liquidity 
flow between participants in a timely manner to ensure 
prompt execution of payments across the system’s 
participants, as well as their customers.
Chart 2 shows the relation between the initial and the 
average distribution of liquidity for all participants on all 
dates. Each point on the chart represents the initial and 
average share of an individual’s liquidity on a given day 
in the sample. Points above the 45-degree line repre-
sent participants that held more liquidity throughout the 
day than at the beginning of the day; points below the 
45-degree line are participants that held less liquidity 
during the day than at the beginning of the day. Since 
the majority of points do not lie on the 45-degree line, 
we can see that the distribution of liquidity throughout 
the day does not match the initial allocation. This is an 
important point, since a participant outage during the 
5  A measure of liquidity in the LVTS is defined in the Box on page 16.
day can lead to difficulties for the system if that partici-
pant holds a large amount of system liquidity (mcPhail 
and Senger 2002).
Bech, Chapman, and Garratt go on to investigate the 
intraday dynamics of liquidity in the LVTS. Using 
empirical methods based on markov chain theory, 
they estimate the unobservable payment speeds of 
LVTS participants by calculating an expected average 
distribution of liquidity (known as a “stationary distri-
bution”). Their estimated payment speeds are 
obtained as follows. Given the model, markov chain 
theory implies that for a given a set of payment 
speeds there is a unique stationary distribution. 
The authors then estimate the payment speeds by 
matching the stationary distribution to the observed 
average distribution of liquidity in the model.
Their results show that there is a large degree of 
heterogeneity in payment speeds. In the most extreme 
case, one participant can be six times quicker in pro-
cessing outgoing payments than another.
As illustrated by Chart 3, when the speed of payment 
processing is taken into account, the stationary distri-
bution of liquidity holdings in the LVTS shows a closer 
match with the participants’ average liquidity holdings. 
Chart 3 is similar to Chart 2, with the exception that 
the horizontal axis now contains the expected sta-
tionary distribution instead of the historical initial 
distribution, and the liquidity holdings of individual 
participants (both average and stationary) are segre-
gated by colour to show that there is a clear ranking 
of the amount of average liquidity held among 
participants.
6
6  Each colour represents all the daily observations of average and stationary liquidity for 
a given bank in the LVTS.
Chart 2:  Initial versus average liquidity holdings
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Zhang (2010) use the network aspects of LVTS trans-
actions data to examine various degrees of inter-
connectedness among the system’s direct 
participants.
7 The researchers examine whether LVTS 
participants send payments to all other LVTS partici-
pants equally, or whether they form clusters of trans-
action relationships and then send relatively more 
payments to members of the same cluster. knowledge 
of this partition can help to identify groups or clusters 
of closely connected participants. Identifying these 
clusters or partitions is important to understanding 
the impact of a participant outage on the entire system. 
Identifying these clusters or partitions is 
important to understanding  
the impact of a participant outage on 
the entire system.
Chapman and Zhang use the model derived by Čopič, 
Jackson, and kirman (2009) to estimate the most 
probable partitions of participants. This model uses 
the concept of “community” and assumes that par-
ticipants that are members of the same community 
transact with each other relatively more intensely than 
with participants outside the community. 
To measure this relative intensity, the model requires a 
measure of transaction intensity among LVTS partici-
pants, as well as a pair-wise maximum level of inten-
sity (or capacity). These maximums are constructed 
for every combination of participants to serve as a 
7  Direct participants are the financial institutions that are members of the LVTS.
benchmark for comparison with the actual observed 
payment flow. Chapman and Zhang use two meas-
ures of transaction intensity: (i) a “liquidity” measure 
that compares the average daily total value of pay-
ments sent from one participant to another against an 
estimate of the cyclical maximum liquidity available to 
the payment sender,
8 and (ii) an “averages” measure 
that compares a payment sender’s outflow of bilateral 
transactions with its multilateral average.
9 This last 
measure effectively takes into account the fact that 
LVTS participants differ by orders of magnitude in the 
amount of payments they make.
Using these two measures, the authors find that the 
most likely partition of the LVTS network includes two 
larger communities that seem to be based on both 
transactions amount and geographic location. One 
community consists of the five major Canadian banks; 
the other is a smaller community of financial institu-
tions that are more regionally focused and based in 
montréal. These two communities are not easily dis-
cernible if one looks only at simpler metrics, such as 
bilateral payment flows. Uncovering such a network 
structure can have useful policy implications. For 
example, identifying clusters can contribute to a 
better understanding of the potential impact of prob-
lems experienced by a key member of a community, 
even if they are not one of the largest participants in 
the system.
Benefits and Limitations
work on network centrality and clustering could be 
useful in helping to assess a participant’s systemic 
importance in payments systems and in the financial 
system more generally. The simulated system-wide 
effect of removing a bank or combination of banks 
further illustrates this potential network aspect of a 
disruption. Even though the exact consequences of 
any particular bank failure are unknown in advance, 
the presence of significant network linkages between 
banks could exacerbate the problem. In these cases, 
a relative ranking of banks’ centrality in the payments 
system could help prioritize the policy responses of 
financial regulators in the event of any future financial 
crisis. 
Empirical research on the structure of financial sys-
tems suffers from a scarcity of data. whereas  
8  It is estimated as the sum of the maximum amount of daily gross payment receipts and 
the maximum bilateral credit limit granted to the payment sender.
9  Under the “averages” measure, the observed interaction among pairs of participants is 
defined to be the number of days on which one participant’s payment flow to the other 
exceeds the average payment flow to all system members.
Chart 3:  Stationary versus average liquidity holdings
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off- balance-sheet exposures is not usually readily 
available, payments systems offer an opportunity to 
observe actual financial activity. But even with this 
payment information, such as LVTS data, a direct 
connection to a participant’s underlying financial 
activity might be difficult to detect because of lack  
of information about payment rationale, or the amount 
of time between a payment request and the corres-
ponding payment settlement. nonetheless, innovative 
econometric techniques can complement network 
analysis by helping to interpret the economic signifi-
cance of observed payments data.
Payments data typically reveal little about the financial 
linkages that involve indirect participants, and this is 
arguably an obstacle to our understanding of the 
financial system, as well as a challenge to determining 
the systemic importance of individual banks.
10 There 
have been some recent attempts to capture these 
indirect linkages. For example, Becher, millard, and 
Soramäki (2008) use the 2003 ChAPS Traffic Survey 
by the Bank of England, which consists of a sample of 
ChAPS payments for five days in February 2003, 
including those of indirect participants.
11 The Banking 
Act 2009 in the United kingdom has since legislated 
that the Bank of England can require the operators of 
interbank payments systems to provide it with infor-
mation, including data on indirect clearers, as it 
deems necessary (Bank of England 2009). For its part, 
the Bank of Canada does not regularly collect data 
from Canadian payments systems apart from the 
LVTS. Further surveys or data access on financial 
10 Indirect participants are smaller banks and deposit-taking institutions that are not 
direct members of the payments system and that, instead, rely on direct participants to 
execute payments on their behalf.
11  The Clearing House Automated Payments System (CHAPS) is the United Kingdom’s 
wholesale system.
Bech, Chapman, and Garratt (2010) focus on the 
Tranche 2 payment stream in the LVTS.
1 They study 
Tranche 2 for two reasons. First, the majority of 
payments are executed in this Tranche of the 
LVTS.
2 Second, in Tranche 2, the amount and size 
of payments between any two pairs of participants 
are restricted by mutually agreed upon Bilateral 
Credit Limits (BCLs), as well as a multilateral net 
Debit Cap for all Tranche 2 payments, known as 
T2nDC. A participant’s T2nDC is a function of the 
BCLs granted to that participant.
3 These BCLs are 
backed by collateral posted by the system 
participants.
The usual definition of liquidity is the ability to make 
a trade or payment promptly. The authors therefore 
define the liquidity available to a participant in the 
system at any moment as the net payments that 
1  The LVTS is composed of two payment streams: Tranche 1 and Tranche 2. The two 
streams differ primarily in terms of collateralization. Tranche 1 payments are fully 
collateralized by the sender and settle in real time on a gross basis like an RTGS 
system in many other countries, while Tranche 2 payments are partially collateral-
ized by the sender and are also backed by a survivors-pay collateral pool and are 
settled at the end of the day on a net basis.
2  Tranche 1 payments are primarily payments between participants and the Bank of 
Canada. These are for transactions such as foreign exchange settlement.
3  This is a necessarily brief explanation of the institutional details of the LVTS 
system. Arjani and McVanel (2006) provide further information.
have been made to the participant, as well as their 
initial T2nDC. The latter can be thought of as 
liquidity since it is the maximum amount of pay-
ments that a participant can make unilaterally. 
Since the summation of all net payments in the 
system must equal zero at any moment, the sum of 
the T2nDCs may be thought of as the total amount 
of available liquidity in the system.
The authors calculate the initial share of this total 
available liquidity to which each participant has 
access at the start of a payment cycle as the ratio 
of each participant’s T2nDC to the sum of T2nDCs. 
The authors then propose a measure for the 
observed average amount of liquidity that one 
participant holds during a payment cycle. This is 
defined as the total of two quantities: the time-
weighted sum of the liquidity balance in Tranche 2, 
and the participant’s T2nDC on that day. The first 
part of the quantity is the average net payments to 
an individual participant during the day, and the 
second is the initial amount of liquidity held by the 
individual participant. The distribution of such 
average liquidity holdings across all participants 
represents the average allocation of liquidity 
between participants in the LVTS.
Defining Liquidity in the LVTS
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exposures or payments in Canada would be beneficial 
for understanding the structure of the Canadian finan-
cial system.
Conclusion
network analysis is a relatively new method of ana-
lyzing financial systems. This approach allows 
researchers to study the operation of the payments 
system as a whole, rather than at the participant level. 
For example, recent work on the LVTS has uncovered 
a couple of communities within the payments system 
and has provided new ways to evaluate the systemic 
importance of participants. This type of information 
significantly enhances the ability of financial-stability 
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